Interesty read I stumbled upon
https://www.academia.edu/12876734/A_note_on_the_dynamics_of_psychiatric_classification
A note on the dynamics of psychiatric classification
Conclusion
The looping effects of human classifications and the social construction of pathological niches occur in virtue of humans having the capacity to form conscious mental representations, which are responsible for the production of behavioral manifestations. The way people think has an impact contiguous with organic dysfunctions
—
not metaphysically inferior to what may be viewed as ‘genuine’ causal properties. This is why the biomedical model should not be abandoned, but amended . We can understand how the social can be mediated by the biological through the study of how our brains form social representation. And we can understand how different experience of psychological afflictions can arise from similar biology through the study of individual developmental pathways with regard to a variety of inputs (Oyama, 2000).
Thus Murphy’s view, as Guze’s, rightly eschews the common distinction between psychiatry and clinical neuropsychology. But it does so while taking into account the possibility that intrinsic impairment in cognitive architecture might be detectable even in the absence of clear anatomical evidence. Thus, accommodating a theory of psychiatric explanation within the field of cognitive neuroscience with attention to the dynamics of classifications seems like our best shot at finally reconciling biology and society
and honoring Hacking’s insights.
https://www.academia.edu/12876734/A_note_on_the_dynamics_of_psychiatric_classification
A note on the dynamics of psychiatric classification
Conclusion
The looping effects of human classifications and the social construction of pathological niches occur in virtue of humans having the capacity to form conscious mental representations, which are responsible for the production of behavioral manifestations. The way people think has an impact contiguous with organic dysfunctions
—
not metaphysically inferior to what may be viewed as ‘genuine’ causal properties. This is why the biomedical model should not be abandoned, but amended . We can understand how the social can be mediated by the biological through the study of how our brains form social representation. And we can understand how different experience of psychological afflictions can arise from similar biology through the study of individual developmental pathways with regard to a variety of inputs (Oyama, 2000).
Thus Murphy’s view, as Guze’s, rightly eschews the common distinction between psychiatry and clinical neuropsychology. But it does so while taking into account the possibility that intrinsic impairment in cognitive architecture might be detectable even in the absence of clear anatomical evidence. Thus, accommodating a theory of psychiatric explanation within the field of cognitive neuroscience with attention to the dynamics of classifications seems like our best shot at finally reconciling biology and society
and honoring Hacking’s insights.