Worrying about control and what aspect that would have on things is entirely reasonable.
What we have right now, however, is the illusion of "anything goes" - when really, what we have is "nothing goes" -- so as long as you want to risk jail, it's "anything goes".
I guess the point is what you want to contrast a proposed scheme to.
If you contrast a proposed scheme to a situation where legally, anything goes, then the scheme is very likely to look "bad" and a scheme which inherently limits options or raise prices or otherwise interferes in a "free market".
If you contrast a proposed scheme to the current sitution, then virtually anything is better than what's available now. That's a rather illusory way to assess how GOOD a scheme could be however, as in almost any case, a bad scheme is better than no scheme.
For my part, I'd suggest the usefulness of a scheme be assessed only as a stop-gap measure. Once it pretends to be a "final product" in this current prohibition market, it tends to highlight things poorly.
For example, let's go back to government monopoly weed for a moment. Let's suppose that the state decides it will put out a tender for a grow op to grow 12 tons of weed annually and supply it the state government dispensary. Weed must be in 12 different strains, in varying strengths (assume for a moment that product mix is at least defenceably "reasonable").
Assume that state government purports to say that the grower can only grow for the government - nobody else. Strict controls put in place so supply only goes to state. Chances of diversion are GREATLY reduced (though never eliminated). Prosecution under current Federal regime are ZERO under such a scheme for the forseeable future. (Conspiracy theorists can stop reading now.)
State Gov further stipulates that the maximum bid they will consider receiving a tender for is $30 an ounce.
Companies can bid less than that to win tender. Ok?
Assume that a bunch of companies bid and somebody wins a tender for supplying that quantity of weed for an average price of $14 an ounce.
State dispensary sells weed at $30 an ounce (average) to patients. There is no physical retail dispensary. All weed is instead delivered by courier to the patient's home.
Assume the grower makes a reasonable return on investment capital with that price, call it 20%. Risk of loss is nil, provided that costs can be contained.
What will happen in this scenario?
1. Most patients will buy the weed they need, cheaply.
2. Many patients will buy more than they need, cheaply. Most of those who do, will share it with friends, but sizeable numbers will not.
3. A sizeable number will still seek to flip that weed on the market. They will make money, more than paying for their own supply with some extra $$ left over, too. Because their risk is small and their supply regular and guaranteed, they will be prepared to flip it for less than market price. This will increase the supply of weed and put a downward price pressure on the black market.
Initial result - patients get the weed they need cheaply, some patients make a black market profit, weed growers make less.
Interim result - some patients see the potential for gain. They will pressure their doctor to increase their dosage and some of those will do so. They will divert even more cheap weed to the black market as the scheme progresses in time. Prohibitionists loudly complain - and those with a vested interest in current black market do too. Essentially, every ounce grown by the legal monopolist is sold. Supply increases, downward price pressure on black market results somewhat. Growers complain. Mexican Cartels are a little pissed.
Final stage: A certain portion of public is "outraged" that gov't weed is being sold and flipped to black market. Many patients making increasing demands for unreasonable dosages just to make a buck. Most patients acting within confines of rules without flipping it say their cheap and fair supply is being threatened by a few bad apples (which, in fairness, is a lot higher a number of bad apples than the legal patients would prefer to admit). Downward price pressure in market makes illegal growers and sellers annoyed.
Assume monopolist grower can adjust his supply upwards as needed at that price, to respond to increasing demands of the system and to eliminate shortages in the medium term (shortages of product to legal patients caused by demand for cheap products to be bought and flipped is the supply problem inherent in this scenario I think. That's the part where the free marketers predictions of doom will bear some fruit.).
Isn't it most likely in this whole scenario that the only thing that is likely to happen is that as long as the government can withstand public pressure, the supply of cheap marijuana goes up - forcing black market prices downwards somewhat, patients who need the price break are happy - and the world carries on? Isn't that the most likely scenario?
Some would say that the problem of flipping the MMJ is depriving the grower of his "fair" price, but so what? Nobody is forcing him to bid at that price. He chose to do it and is making a ROI which is essentially guaranteed (like all regulated monopolists under Public Utility Price Regulation, I might add). Wouldn't that be a good thing, overall, compared to what we have now, from the patient's perspective?
Assuming you aren't a grower complaining about a somewhat reduced price for your existing product, that is.
What we have right now, however, is the illusion of "anything goes" - when really, what we have is "nothing goes" -- so as long as you want to risk jail, it's "anything goes".
I guess the point is what you want to contrast a proposed scheme to.
If you contrast a proposed scheme to a situation where legally, anything goes, then the scheme is very likely to look "bad" and a scheme which inherently limits options or raise prices or otherwise interferes in a "free market".
If you contrast a proposed scheme to the current sitution, then virtually anything is better than what's available now. That's a rather illusory way to assess how GOOD a scheme could be however, as in almost any case, a bad scheme is better than no scheme.
For my part, I'd suggest the usefulness of a scheme be assessed only as a stop-gap measure. Once it pretends to be a "final product" in this current prohibition market, it tends to highlight things poorly.
For example, let's go back to government monopoly weed for a moment. Let's suppose that the state decides it will put out a tender for a grow op to grow 12 tons of weed annually and supply it the state government dispensary. Weed must be in 12 different strains, in varying strengths (assume for a moment that product mix is at least defenceably "reasonable").
Assume that state government purports to say that the grower can only grow for the government - nobody else. Strict controls put in place so supply only goes to state. Chances of diversion are GREATLY reduced (though never eliminated). Prosecution under current Federal regime are ZERO under such a scheme for the forseeable future. (Conspiracy theorists can stop reading now.)
State Gov further stipulates that the maximum bid they will consider receiving a tender for is $30 an ounce.
Companies can bid less than that to win tender. Ok?
Assume that a bunch of companies bid and somebody wins a tender for supplying that quantity of weed for an average price of $14 an ounce.
State dispensary sells weed at $30 an ounce (average) to patients. There is no physical retail dispensary. All weed is instead delivered by courier to the patient's home.
Assume the grower makes a reasonable return on investment capital with that price, call it 20%. Risk of loss is nil, provided that costs can be contained.
What will happen in this scenario?
1. Most patients will buy the weed they need, cheaply.
2. Many patients will buy more than they need, cheaply. Most of those who do, will share it with friends, but sizeable numbers will not.
3. A sizeable number will still seek to flip that weed on the market. They will make money, more than paying for their own supply with some extra $$ left over, too. Because their risk is small and their supply regular and guaranteed, they will be prepared to flip it for less than market price. This will increase the supply of weed and put a downward price pressure on the black market.
Initial result - patients get the weed they need cheaply, some patients make a black market profit, weed growers make less.
Interim result - some patients see the potential for gain. They will pressure their doctor to increase their dosage and some of those will do so. They will divert even more cheap weed to the black market as the scheme progresses in time. Prohibitionists loudly complain - and those with a vested interest in current black market do too. Essentially, every ounce grown by the legal monopolist is sold. Supply increases, downward price pressure on black market results somewhat. Growers complain. Mexican Cartels are a little pissed.
Final stage: A certain portion of public is "outraged" that gov't weed is being sold and flipped to black market. Many patients making increasing demands for unreasonable dosages just to make a buck. Most patients acting within confines of rules without flipping it say their cheap and fair supply is being threatened by a few bad apples (which, in fairness, is a lot higher a number of bad apples than the legal patients would prefer to admit). Downward price pressure in market makes illegal growers and sellers annoyed.
Assume monopolist grower can adjust his supply upwards as needed at that price, to respond to increasing demands of the system and to eliminate shortages in the medium term (shortages of product to legal patients caused by demand for cheap products to be bought and flipped is the supply problem inherent in this scenario I think. That's the part where the free marketers predictions of doom will bear some fruit.).
Isn't it most likely in this whole scenario that the only thing that is likely to happen is that as long as the government can withstand public pressure, the supply of cheap marijuana goes up - forcing black market prices downwards somewhat, patients who need the price break are happy - and the world carries on? Isn't that the most likely scenario?
Some would say that the problem of flipping the MMJ is depriving the grower of his "fair" price, but so what? Nobody is forcing him to bid at that price. He chose to do it and is making a ROI which is essentially guaranteed (like all regulated monopolists under Public Utility Price Regulation, I might add). Wouldn't that be a good thing, overall, compared to what we have now, from the patient's perspective?
Assuming you aren't a grower complaining about a somewhat reduced price for your existing product, that is.
